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A CRITIQUE OF THE DUST EXPLOSIBILITY INDEX: AN ALTERNATIVE 
FOR ESTIMATING EXPLOSION PROBABILITIES 
By M. Hertzberg1 
ABSTRACT 
This Bureau of Mines report proposes a new methodology for estimating 
industrial dust explosion hazards in terms of three probabilities or co-
factors: The dispersion of the dust, the existence of a flammable dust 
concentration, and the presence of an effective source of ignition. 
This method or rationale is proposed as a replacement for the "explosi-
bility index" that was first suggested 25 yr ago, but which, by consen-
sus among leading researchers in the field, is now outdated. This 
report presents a detailed critique of the deficiencies of that old, 
material-oriented index, and develops the logical .rationale for its re-
placement by an approach that is better suited for quantitative hazard 
evaluations. A variety of such evaluations are illustrated, which show 
how a quantitative prediction of explosion frequencies can be obtained 
from laboratory measurements and operating conditions in a given indus-
trial facility. The method has some pitfalls, particularly as they re-
late to the correlation of events or their randomness. These are dis-
cussed, as well as the method's other limitations and uncertainties. 
This work is intended to provide a beginning to a quantitative approach 
to explosion hazard assessment. To that end, a new method is proposed 
for estimating thermal ignition probabilities in terms of the measured 
laboratory autoignition temperature of a dust, its relationship to the 
operating temperature, and its distribution within a given industrial 
system. 
1supervisory research chemist, Pittsburgh Research Center, Bureau of Mines, Pitts-
burgh, PA. 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been about 25 yr since the Bureau of Mines first proposed the use of an ex-
plosibility index for evaluation of the explosion potential of dusts (l-l).2 Its 
original formulation was designed to provide approximate ratings that would be con-
sistent with overall practical experience. It was not, however, based on a detailed 
theoretical analysis of the problem, or an exact study of accident statistics (2). 
The proposed explosibility index was the product of two parameters: The ignition 
sensitivity and the explosion severity. These parameters were determined by actual 
measurements made in laboratory-scale systems (i). The first parameter, the ignition 
sensitivity, was defined in terms of the product of three measured quantities for a 
given dust: The minimum cloud ignition temperature, Tml n; the minimum spark ignition 
energy, €mln; and the minimum explosive dust concentration, CL' The product of those 
three measured quantities for Pittsburgh seam pulverized coal, divided by the product 
of those same three measured quantities for any given dust sample, defined that 
dust's ignition sensitivity. Thus 
Ignition Sensitivity (Tm1n x Emln x CL) Pittsburgh coal dust (T m1n x €mln x CL) sample dust 
(1) 
The second parameter, the explosion severity, was defined in terms of the product 
of two measured quantities: The maximum explosion pressure Pmax and the maximum rate 
of pressure rise, (dp/dt)max, at a dust concentration of 500 g/m3• The product of 
those two quantities for any given dust sample, divided by the product of those same 
two quantities for the "standard" or reference dust, Pittsburgh seam pulverized coal 
~ust, defined the explosion severity. Thus, 
Explosion severity = [Pmax x (dp/dt)max] sample dust (2 ) [Pmax x (dp/dt)max] Pittsburgh coal dust 
Finely pulverized Pittsburgh seam coal dust was used as the standard of comparison 
because its explosivity behavior had already been extensively studied in both full-
scale mine experiments (i) and in laboratory-scale systems (~). 
The final product of the ignition sensitivity parameter, and the explosion severity 
parameter, defined the final explosibility index. Thus: 
Explosibility Index = Ignition Sensitivity x Explosive Severity. (3) 
Any given dust was then classified as being capable of generating weak, moderate, 
strong, or severe explosions, depending on its explosibility index (2). If the 
explosibility index was less than 0.1, the dust was rated as having a weak explosion 
hazard. For an index between 0.1 and 1.0, it was rated as modepate. For an index of 
1.0 to 10, the dust was rated as having a stpong explosion hazard. For an index of 
greater than 10, it was rated as sevepe. 
In recent years, the index ratings based on equations 1, 2, and 3 have fallen out 
of favor. Current researchers in the field object to the use of such a combined 
index system, which mixes so many different parameters. Such a mixing confuses the 
issue of how to apply the laboratory measurements to a hazard evaluation for a given 
industrial system (~). Furthermore, the consensus is that the critical parameter in 
2Underlined numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references at 
the end of this report. 
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obtaining a hazard evaluation is not the 
explosivity properties of a dust relative 
to some other dust (such as Pittsburgh 
seam coal). but rather. their values rel-
ative to the operating conditions within 
the industrial system being evaluated 
(8). At a recent symposium entitled 
"International Symposium on the Explosion 
Hazard Classification of Vapors. Gases 
and Dusts" (7). there was a virtually 
unanimous opinion that the index ratings 
based on equations 1 to 3 should no 
longer be used. 
The major objections in previous years 
to the use of those index ratings were 
directed towards the older laboratory-
scale test equipment and methods (i) that 
were used to measure the quantities Tmfn. 
gmln. CL. Pmax. and (dp/dt)max (9-13). 
The criticisms were based in part on~he 
fact that those earlier. laboratory-scale 
systems gave results that were in dis-
agreement with larger-scale tests (~). 
These contradictions between laboratory-
scale and full-scale experiments could 
lead to dangerous misapprehensions be-
cause they generally erred by underesti-
mating the hazard. The older laboratory-
scale tests gave low explosivity indices 
for dusts that were known to be capable 
of generating strong explosions in larger 
scale tests. The major cause of those 
discrepancies were the ignitability limi-
tations of the older laboratory-scale 
systems. Those contradictions have been 
essentially resolved by the development 
of a new generation of laboratory-scale 
systems 10-11. 12-~). Those new sys-
tems and methods require that data be 
obtained in the asymptotic limit of 
high ignition energies, and they give 
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laboratory results that are in good 
agreement with mine tests (1I-~). The 
developers of those older. laboratory-
scale systems were aware of the conflicts 
with mine-scale results. and attempted to 
compensate for them (i). Nevertheless. 
the practical imperatives of their times 
seem to have required that some classifi-
cation or rating scheme be available 
despite its limitations (19). 
Although some feel a greater confidence 
in the newer experimental methods. there 
is no consensus for using the newer data 
in the old explosibility index (equations 
1 to 3). 
Just as there was a long recognized 
need for improved laboratory-scale tests 
and methods that would give results that 
are in agreement with the more costly and 
time-consuming full-scale tests. there is 
an equally compelling need to develop a 
new hazard evaluation method that is more 
realistic and in better agreement with 
real-world experience. The central pur-
pose of this report is to support that 
emerging consensus and to provide the 
guidelines for obtaining such a realistic 
hazard assessment. The old index formu-
lation of equations 1 to 3 has already 
served its purpose and should no longer 
be used; this report will document its 
major inadequacies. An alternative ap-
proach will be proposed. which is based 
on an overall analysis of the explosion 
hazard problem. The alternative provides 
for an evaluation of the hazard not just 
in terms of the intrinsic flammability 
properties of a dust. but also the re-
lationship of those properties to the 
operating conditions in any given plant 
or facility in which the dust is present. 
RATIONALE AND CRITIQUE 
When considering any system of physical 
space, the following question arises: 
What is the propability of a dust explo-
sion occurring in that region of space? 
Three conditions must be satisfied before 
a dust explosion can occur: 
1. 
must 
2. 
dust 
The dust contained within a system 
be dispersed and mixed with the air, 
The concentration of dispersed 
must be above the lean limit of 
flammability (the minimum explosive 
concentration) • 
3. An ignition source must be pres-
ent of sufficient power density and 
total energy to initiate the combustion 
wave, whose propagation generates the 
explosion. 
For the 
problem. it 
the three 
initial consideration of this 
is implicitly assumed that 
conditions are mutually 
" 
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independent of one another. Accordingly, 
the probability of a dust explosion oc-
curring Pr(expl) can be quantified in 
terms of the product of the probabilities 
of each of those three conditions being 
satisfied. Thus 
Pr(expl) = Pr(d) x Pr(f) x Pr(i) (4) 
where Pr(d) is the probability of dis-
persing the dust that may have previously 
accumulated on surfaces within the system 
being considered; Pr(f) is the probabil-
ity of having a dispersed concentration 
that is above the lean limit of flamma-
bility; and Pr(i) is the probability of 
having an adequate ignition source pres-
ent in the system. Equation 4 will serve 
as the fundamental guideline for a basic, 
alternative approach to evaluating the 
dust explosion hazard. 
DUST DISPERSION, Pr(d) 
A major inadequacy of the explosibility 
index in equation 3 is that it does not 
include the first condition of equation 
4, which deals with the dispersibility of 
the dust. 
For a given dust loading on the interi-
or surfaces of a mine, factory, or other 
facility, and in the presence of a given 
aerodynamic disturbance, the ease with 
which a dust can be dispersed into the 
air is a function of several factors: 
the individual density of the dust par-
ticles, their diameters, their shape, 
their cohesive properties with respect to 
each other, and their adhesive properties 
with respect to supporting surfaces. 
External factors also playa role in the 
dispersion process: the structure and 
intensity of aerodynamic disturbances, 
the location of the dust loading (roof, 
floor, walls, or shelves), the geometry 
of those surfaces, and other factors 
related to the operation of the mine or 
factory. The details of dust dispersion 
dynamics will not be considered in detail 
here; however, the problem becomes moot 
in systems in which the dust is dispersed 
by design, as in a pulverizer or in a 
pneumatic transport line whose function 
is to transport dust in an airstream. In 
the pulverized coal-firing system of a 
power plant or a cement kiln using air as 
the transport medium, Pr(d) = 1. Fur-
thermore, under normal operating condi-
tions, for typical feed ratios of coal 
to air in such systems, Pr(f) = 1. In 
those systems, according to equation 4, 
the explosion probability is then deter-
mined exclusively by the probability of 
ignition, Pr(i). 
Equation 4 is equally valid for a fuel 
gas explosion and for a dust explosion. 
However, the dispersion and mixing prob-
lem for dusts is markedly different from 
that of gaseous fuels. The mass density 
of the solids from which the dusts are 
generated are typically factors of a 
thousand greater than the density of air 
into which they are dispersed. Accord-
ingly, the everpresent gravitational 
force tends to segregate the dust from 
the air at a rate that is characterized 
by the settling velocity of the dust par-
ticles or their agglomerates. Intense 
airflows are usually required to disperse 
the dust against gravity and to maintain 
the dust-air mixture in a uniformly dis-
persed state. By contrast, for gaseous 
fuels, their molecular sizes and densi-
ties are comparable to that of the air, 
so that the airflows associated with the 
fuel's initial velocity, or even the 
everpresent natural convective eddies, 
are sufficient to mix the gas rather 
rapidly into the surrounding air. Fur-
thermore, for the gas, once the flammable 
mixture is generated, the mixing is inti-
mate on the molecular scale, and external 
forces of significant magnitude to cause 
the fuel to resegregate are rare. A 
flammable, homogeneous gas-air mixture in 
a given isolated enclosure will remain 
explosive indefinitely. All that is then 
necessary to generate a gas explosion is 
an ignition source. For a dust-air mix-
ture, on the other hand, if the dispers-
ing flow is stopped, the dust will settle 
out rapidly depending on the particle 
settling velocities. The dust thus re-
segregates rapidly on surfaces within the 
system. In such a system in which the 
dust has settled, the presence of an 
ignition source, by itself, will not 
generate an explosion unless the dust is 
redispersed into the ignition source. In 
view of the contrasting behavior between 
dusts and gases, it can be argued that 
dust fuels are intrinsically less hazard-
ous than gaseous fuels. The more diffi-
cult dispersion requirement for the solid 
dust is an additional limitation on the 
generation of a flammable volume, which 
might provide the dust system with an 
additional margin of safety. 
The difference in the ease of disper-
sion of a gas, relative to that of a 
dust, is both advantageous and disadvan-
tageous from a safety viewpoint. The 
same rapid and irreversible mixing pro-
cess that facilitates the generation of a 
flammable volume from a gaseous fuel leak 
in air also facilitates the dilution of 
that fuel leak. 
Consider a mine or factory through 
which air can flow at some fixed volumet-
ric rate that is maintained by forced 
convection or even by natural convection. 
The ventilating air currents ensure the 
rapid mixing of gaseous fuel leaks with 
air. If the volume of the ventilating 
airflow rate is much larger than the vol-
umetric flow of fuel, there will be ade-
quate dilution of the gaseous fuel. The 
fuel concentration throughout the mine or 
factory will then remain well below the 
lean limit concentration and Pr(f) = O. 
In that case, Pr(exp1) = 0 regardless of 
the presence or absence of an ignition 
source. Once the fuel gas is diluted 
adequately, there normally is no oppor-
tunity for a dangerous accumulation. For 
the gaseous fuel, there is no subsequent 
demixing in the flow and the large ven-
tilation flow will "dilute, carry away, 
and render harmless" whatever small fuel 
leaks may exist (20-~). Such dilution 
by adequate ventilation is clearly the 
most effective means of preventing gas 
explosions from a fuel source of small or 
moderate intensity. 
However, in the case of a dust, the 
normal ventilation velocities in most 
~~gions of mines or factories are gener-
ally much too low to transport dust out 
of the system. For most dust sizes, 
gravitational settling velocities are too 
high relative to ventilation velocities 
and the ventilation flow is ineffective 
in remolTing the dust. Accordingly, the 
dust accumulates in time, and a loading 
density is eventually reached that 
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readily exceeds an explosive dust loading 
even if the rate of dust generation is 
ra ther mild. 
In summary, for a gaseous fuel source 
or leaks into the system, adequate venti-
lation can ensure that Pr(f) remains 
zero; however, for a dust source, the 
normal ventilation is generally not ef-
fective, and after some time interval 
Pr(f) will inevitably become unity_ For 
the dust, some countermeasure other than 
normal ventilation must be taken to 
remove the accumulation or to neutralize 
its presence. For the fuel gas leak, the 
hazard is a function only of the gas 
source intensity relative to the ventila-
tion flow, and if these quantities are 
constant and the latter is strong enough 
to insure sufficient dilution to well 
below the lean limit, then Pr(f) can be 
maintained at a zero level indefinitely. 
For the dust source, however, normal ven-
tilation will not prevent its accumula-
tion, and the hazard will increase in 
time as more regions of the system ap-
proach a flammable dust loading with 
Pr(f) = 1. 
FLAMMABILITY LIMITS, Pr(f) 
Whether the fuel being considered is a 
gas or a dust, an explosive reaction with 
air is possible only within a range of 
fuel concentrations. Those concentra-
tions are defined as the limits of flam-
mability (~-23). For gaseous fuels, 
there are usually both lean and rich 
limits; however, for dusts, a normal rich 
limit does not exist (..!.Q-Q, Q, Q). 
The contrasting behavior between gases 
and dusts is illustrated in figure 1, 
which compares methane gas in air with 
polyethylene dust in air. Methane shows 
normal lean and rich limits beyond which 
explosions are impossible, whereas the 
dust shows only a normal lean limit. For 
all dust concentrations below the lean 
limit, Pr(f) = O. For dust concentra-
tions that exceed the lean limit, Pr(f) 
= 1. Accordingly, in order to obtain a 
realistic hazard evaluation, Pr(f) may be 
simply quantified as the fraction of time 
the system exists in a state where its 
dust concentration is above the lean 
limit. 
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FIGURE 1.-Comparison of flammability limits for methane 
gas and polyethylene dust in air. 
Although that definition of Pr(f) ap-
pears simple, there is a hidden ambiguity 
that requires clarification. Is the dust 
concentration referred to above the actu-
al ~ispersed dust concentration, or is it 
the potential dust concentration if all 
the dust accumulated on surfaces were 
dispersed? The dispersed dust concentra-
tion is readily expressed in normal vol-
umetric concentration units of grams of 
dust per cubic meter of system volume (as 
in figure 1). If the dust is initially 
present on surfaces within that volume, 
then its distribution is more accurately 
described by surface loading density, 
which is the mass accumulation per unit 
surface area. The volumetric concentra-
tion that would be achieved if that sur-
face loading of dust were distributed 
throughout the system volume can be cal-
culated, but, that concentration is 
achieved only if there is perfect disper-
sion. If the dispersion is imperfect, 
higher concentrations are present in some 
regions and lower concentrations in 
others. In many industrial situations, 
that ambiguity is always present, and it 
plays an important role in the hazard 
evaluation. 
Laboratory experiments designed to 
measure the flammability limits of a 
dust, such as those shown in figure 1, 
avoid such ambiguities. Great care is 
taken to effectively disperse a known 
mass of dust into a known volume, so that 
its concentration is uniform throughout 
the test volume (10, 16). In those 
cases, Pr(d) = 1. Furthermore, in such 
experiments, an effective ignition source 
must be present so that Pr(i) = 1. In 
such laboratory experiments, according to 
equation 4, Pr(expl) = Pr(f), and the oc-
currence or nonoccurrence of an explosion 
is determined uniquely by the existence 
or nonexistence of a flammable dust con-
centration. There are some industrial 
systems that clearly approximate those 
laboratory experiments: Pneumatic dust 
transport systems between a coal pulver-
izer and the burner of a coal-fired 
boiler; in the pulverized coal feed lines 
to a cement kiln; or in the case of a 
dust dryer, where the dust and the air 
are more or less uniformly mixed. In 
those industrial systems, Pr(d) = 1. The 
dust concentration in those systems is 
fairly uniform and is given approximately 
by the ratio of the mass flow rate of the 
dust divided by the volumetric flow rate 
of the air. 
In other industrial systems, the dust 
accumulation is incidental so that it is 
present mainly on surfaces within the 
system. When attempts are made to evalu-
ate the hazard associated with the dust's 
presence on surfaces, the ambiguity is 
inevitable. Even if it is known pre-
cisely what the surface loading density 
may be within the volumetric enclosure 
being studied, there is still an uncer-
taintity as to whether that loading den-
sity can cause a lean limit concentration 
to be generated by an aerodynamic distur-
bance. Will the aerodynamic disturbance 
disperse the dust throughout the entire 
volume of the enclosure, or will the dis-
turbance be more likely to disperse the 
dust through some fraction of the volume? 
The properties of the dispersion system 
can now play a role in determining 
whether a lean limit concentration is at-
tained and the two probabilities, Pr(d) 
and Pr(f), are no longer mutually 
independent of one another. 
Consider for example, a system of one 
cubic meter containing 60 g of Pittsburgh 
seam pulverized coal dust on the floor of 
the chamber. The lean limit concentra-
tion for that coal is 90 g/m3. What then 
is Pr(f) for that system? If the dust is 
uniformly dispersed throughout the volume 
by a strong aerodynamic disturbance, the 
concentration would be 60 g/m3, which is 
below the lean limit. Thus, for a strong 
f 
disturbance, Pr(f) = O. If, however, the 
aerodynamic disturbance were weaker so 
that dispersion were limited to the lower 
half of the chamber (but still strong 
enough to lift all the dust), then the 
concentration of dust in the lower half 
would be 120 g/m3, which is above the 
lean limit. For the weak disturbance in 
the lower half of the volume, Pr(f) = 1. 
An ignition source in the lower half of 
the chamber could then initiate an explo-
sion in the system. Since in that in-
stance, the flammable volume would only 
be half the chamber volume, the resultant 
explosion pressure would be halved. For 
the perfectly-dispersed dust, such an 
explosion would have been impossible. 
Based on full-scale experiments con-
ducted in the mine entries at Bruceton 
and the Lake Lynn Laboratory, there seems 
to be an uncertainty of approximately a 
factor of two, between the lean limit 
concentration of a pre dispersed dust 
cloud and the minimum surface loading re-
quired to propagate an explosion when the 
dust is not intentionally predispersed 
(24-~). For Pittsburgh seam coal dust, 
the lean limit concentration for the 
uniformly predispersed dust is about 90 
g/m3 (~), whereas the minimum surface 
loading required to propagate an explo-
sion corresponds to about 35 to 60 g of 
dust per cubic meter of the dusted vol-
ume. The minimum surface loading is a 
function of where the dust is placed; 
with loading on roof shelves being more 
hazardous than the same loading on the 
floor (5). In such systems, Pr(d) and 
Pr(f) are not mutually independent of one 
another. 
For practical evaluations, the uncer-
tainty is probably best resolved by de-
fining Pr(f) in terms of the mass of dust 
contained in the smallest system volume 
that is realistically practical to con-
sider, regardless of whether the dust is 
dispersed or whether it is accumulated on 
surfaces. A conservative estimate of 
Pr(f) is obtained by assuming that for 
purposes of a hazard evaluation, a lean 
limit concentration will be chosen that 
is half of the true measured value. 
Thus, in those industrial systems where 
the dust is not pre dispersed by design, 
but is accumulating on surfaces, Pr(f) 
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will be given by the fraction of time 
that a surface loading density exists, 
which would generate a concentration 
equal to, or above, half the lean limit 
concentration if all the dust were dis-
persed throughout the volume of interest. 
Reasonable judgement must be exercised in 
choosing "the volume of interest." 
IGNITION PROBABILITY, Pr(i) 
Ignition sources are characterized ac-
cording to the type of energy they intro-
duce into the system. The most common 
types of sources are electrical, chemi-
cal, or purely thermal. In general, an 
ignition source can have a variety of 
geometric sizes and shapes, as well as a 
variety of time dependencies for its 
energy delivery rate or power density. 
The "effectiveness" of an ignition source 
is defined by whether or not it ignites a 
flammable volume, and that effectiveness 
will generally be a function of all of 
those factors: ignition source size, 
shape, and power density. As with the 
other probabilities, PrCi) may be simply 
defined as the fraction of time an ef-
fective ignition source is present within 
the system volume. 
Examples of some of the data obtained 
on the effectiveness of chemical (pyro-
technic) sources for the ignition of 
polyethylene, coal dust, and oil shale 
dust are shown in figure 2. The effec-
tive source energy (~ll, 1l) required 
for ignition is plotted as a function of 
fuel concentration. In these experi-
ments, the effective source energy, by 
itself, is usually an adequate descrip-
tion of the source intensity so long as 
the energy is delivered rapidly enough 
and is sufficiently concentrated spatial-
ly. For a source which delivers its 
energy more slowly than the character-
istic induction time for flame genera-
tion, or which is too extended in space, 
the power density, rather than the 
energy, will become the more important 
parameter. It is beyond the scope of 
this report to consider all possible com-
plex geometries of various ignition 
sources or their infinite variety of 
time-dependent delivery rates. It will 
be simply assummed, hereafter, that the 
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ing energy on the ignition of polyethylene, coal, and oil shale 
dusts. 
effectiveness of a given ignition source 
is defined and determinable. 
As indicated, the data in figure 2 are 
for a chemical ignition source that is 
concentrated spatially and temporarily. 
At the other end of the ignition source 
spectrum is a source that is spatially 
and temporally extended. The simplest 
such source is purely thermal and is geo-
metrically uniform in spatial extension 
and steady state in time. Such a source 
is isothermal and its ignition behavior 
can, in principle, be reliably character-
ized solely by its temperature. 
Consider a uniformly predLspersed dust-
air mixture in a large volume at a dust 
concentration above its lean limit of 
flammability so that Pr(d) = 1 and Pr(f) 
= 1. Then, ask the question: To what 
initial temperature must the entire vol-
ume of the system be raised in order for 
it to ignite spontaneously and generate 
an explosion? That initial temperature 
is referred to as the spontaneous "auto-
ignition temperature" (AIT) of the dust. 
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An example of the kind of AIT data ob-
tained with purely thermal ignition 
sources is shown in figure 3 for the case 
of lycopodium dust in air. The apparatus 
and method used were described elsewhere 
(8, 15). The data are for uniformly dis-
persed dusts so that Pr(d) = 1. The 
thermal auto.ignition boundary shown in 
the figure was measured in a region of 
dust concentrations that are above the 
lean limit of flammability, so that Pr(f) 
= 1. Thus, Pr(expl) = Pr(d) Pr(f) = (1) 
(1) Pr(i)= Pr(i); and the explosion pro-
bability is equal to the ignition prob-
ability. The presence or absence of an 
explosion is then causally and uniquely 
related to the presence or absence of an 
adequate ignition source. The thermal 
autoignition boundary between ignition 
(explosion) and nonignition (no explo-
sion) is plotted in temperature versus 
concentration space (at ambient pres-
sure). Also shown is a lower dashed 
curve, which is the lean flammability 
limit boundary in the same concentration-
temperature space. All states of the 
system below and to the left of the lean 
limit boundary are nonflammable or non-
explosive because Pr(f) = O. For states 
above and to the right of that boundary, 
Pr(f) 1, and the explosion prob-
ability is there equal to the ignition 
probability. 
At still higher temperatures and con-
centrations in figure 3, the thermal 
autoignition boundary is encountered, 
$Z 
I 
" 
I 
which is the innermost "core" or "heart" 
of all ignitability surfaces in the sys-
tem's state space. Above that contour, 
explosion is certain because both Pr(f) 
and Pr(i) are unity. No external igni-
tion source is necessary within that core 
because the system ignites spontaneously 
as soon as those dust concentrations are 
dispersed at those initial temperatures. 
The combination of dust concentrations 
and temperatures at or above that contour 
are therefore "pyrophoric" or "hyper-
golic," and the explosion probability is 
unity in that regi9n of the system's 
state space. 
Two quantities that characterize the 
lean limit boundary and the thermal auto-
ignition boundary for any given dust are 
also shown in figure 3. The one is the 
lean limit of flammability at room tem-
perature and ambient pressure. It is 
sometimes also referred to as the "mini-
mum explosive concentration." The other 
is the minimum autoignition temperature, 
which is sometimes also called the "mini-
mum cloud ignition temperature." Those 
two coordinates in temperature-
concentration space characterize the two 
contours. The two contours are generally 
well-behaved with monotonic slopes as 
indicated, and the use of thermodynamic 
diagrams (similar to figure 3) is the 
simplest way to fully understand the re-
lationships between the flammability 
limit and the ignitability behavior of 
any fuel. Elevated temperatures increase 
both the flammability and thermal auto-
ignitability of the system; hence, with 
increasing temperature, the lean limit 
concentration decreases as does the con-
centration at which spontaneous auto-
ignition occurs. At very high tempera-
tures, the two contours generally 
converge. 
CRITIQUE OF THE EXPLOSIBILITY INDEX 
Now that an alternative approach to the 
problem of estimating explosion hazards 
has been sketched, it is appropriate to 
present a detailed analysis of the de-
ficiencies in the old explosibility index 
(equations 1 to 3). The first deficiency 
has already been mentioned in the discus-
sion of Pr(d). The old index does not 
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contain an explicit measure of a dust's 
dispersibility. It is possible, however, 
that in the old experimental methods for 
measuring CL, Emfn, and (dp!dt)max, the 
uncontrollable dispersibility factor 
could actually play a role in determining 
the measured values of those parameters. 
In the case of a strongly agglomerating 
dust, or a dust whose material density 
is high, the dust might not disperse 
effectively, especially in the rather 
weak dispersion pulses used in the older 
systems. As a result, there could be 
large uncertainties in those CL, Emln, or 
(dp!dt)max values, and lack of reproduc-
ibility among the various investigators 
who used different dispersion methods 
(.!..2). The current laboratory methods are 
designed to give complete dispersion so 
that the dispersion variable is no longer 
"hidden." Clearly, such a critical vari-
able should not be hidden or confused 
with the intrinsic flammabiHty or ignit-
ability properties. Rather, the dispers-
ibility should be measured directly so 
that its effect on the explosion hazard 
can be independently evaluated. 
A variety of methods can be used to 
measure the effectiveness of a given 
aerodynamic source in dispersing a given 
dust configuration. Optical dust probe 
instrumentation for measuring the dis-
persion effectiveness of a given dust has 
already been developed by the Bureau, 
(24-25), and it should be a relatively 
simp Ie mat ter to .develop a tes t procedure 
for independently evaluating the dispers-
ibility properties of a dust. That would 
be the first essential step in estimating 
Pr(d) in a given industrial setting. 
Another major problem with the old in-
dex involves the way in which it confuses 
flammability limits with ignitability 
factors. In any practical system, the 
safest mode of operation of a facility 
would be one which operates at a concen-
tration of gaseous fuel or dust that is 
well below the lean limit of flammabil-
ity. In ~hat case, Pr(f) = 0 and the 
explosion probability will remain zero 
regardless of the dispersion probability 
or the strength of any ignition sources. 
Yet, in the old explosibility index, the 
only quantity that relates to Pr(f), the 
minimum explosive concentration, CL, 
I 
I· 
.' 
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appears in the ignition sensitivity pa-
rameter (equation 1). The old index does 
not contain independent evaluations for 
Pr(f) and Pr(i), but instead it mixes the 
two. While Tmin and Emin are important 
determinants of Pr(i), the minimum explo-
sive concentration, CL, is not directly 
related to ignitability. Instead, it is 
th~ main determinant of pdf). In fact, 
the quantities Tmin and Emin cannot even 
be measured unless the dust concentration 
is much larger than CL, and those minima 
in autoignition temperature and spark 
ignition energy occur at dust concentra-
tions that are much higher than CL' The 
mixing of CL with Tmin and Emin is logi-
cally immiscible. The one is a determi-
nant of Pr(f), the fraction of time the 
system exists as a flammable volume. The 
others are determinants of Pr(i), the 
fraction of time an effective ignition 
source is present in the system. The 
intermixing of these two factors conceals 
them both from view and only serves to 
confuse the problem. 
The objective above can be satisfied 
by simply removing CL from the ignition 
sensitivity parameter, which leaves the 
product of Tmln and Emin' both of which 
are logical determinants of Pr(i). There 
are, however, still serious problems with 
that approach. The first objection deals 
with the problem of reliably determining 
Emln for a dust. While the concept of a 
minimum electrical ignition energy for 
homogeneous gas mixtures is well estab-
lished, the concept does not appear to be 
particularly useful for dusts. A de-
tailed consideration of the problem of 
reliably determining a Emln for a dust is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but a 
recent analysis has appeared elsewhere 
12-11). There are so many contradictory 
requirements involved in the experimental 
conditions needed, and such extraordinary 
complications, that a reliable determina-
tion of Emln for a dust is dubious, even 
under the best of circumstances. Fur-
thermore, there are very few well docu-
mented cases in industry of electrically 
initiated dust explosions. Yet, the 
tabulations of the old ignitability index 
show that it is determined mainly by the 
Emln-value. The Emin-value varies by 
orders of magnitude among the various 
dusts, whereas Tmin varies by factors of 
only two or three. While there are some 
important circumstances where the elec-
trical ignitability properties of a dust 
can be significant in determining its 
explosion hazard, the current test meth-
ods for measuring Emln are not repro-
ducible or reliable enough to justify its 
use as the dominant factor in evaluating 
the overall ignitability of a dust. In 
cases where it is important, the prob-
ability of electric ignition, Pr(i, 
spark), requires a separate considera-
tion. With the removal of CL from the 
ignitability parameters, and a separate 
consideration for Emln, one is left fin-
ally with Tmin, the minimum autoignition 
temperature, which controls the purely 
thermal component of the ignition prob-
ability. Let us focus now on the purely 
thermal autoignition probability Pr(i, 
thermal) • 
The ratio (Tmln)Pittsburgh coal/ 
(Tmin)dust was previously used as the 
thermal component of the ignitability in-
dex; however, the choice of a simple lin-
ear function of temperature is quite 
arbitrary and cannot be justified. In 
addition, the use of centigrade degrees 
for Tmln leads to absurdities for dusts 
that are hypergolic, with Tm1n values of 
00 C or below. While such absurdities 
can be eliminated by expressing Tml n in K 
rather than °c, there is still no justi-
fiable -reason for choosing a linear tem-
perature dependence for evaluating the 
thermal autoignitabi1ity of a dust. Us-
ing a ~ineap scale means that a hyper-
golic dust with Tmfn = 300 K is only a 
factor of two more ignitable than a dust 
with a Tml n of 600 K (327° C). A rela-
tively unreactive dust with a Tmf n of 
927 0 C is only a factor of four less 
ignitable than the hypergolic dust. Most 
practical dust-bearing systems operate 
either at room temperature or near 100-
1500 C for drying, with occasional higner 
excursions in certain regions of the sys-
tem, or during startup or shutdown tran-
sients, or under various emergency condi-
tions. It is unreasonable to ascribe 
only a factor of two increase in ignition 
sensitivity or probability to a hyper-
golic dust in comparison to one that re-
quires an ignition temperature of 327° C. 
Similarly, the fraction of industrial 
dust-bearing systems that can even acci-
dently reach temperatures as high as 
927 0 C is so trival in comparison to 
those systems that can occasionally reach 
327 0 C, that it is likewise unreasonable 
to ascribe only a factor of two differ-
ences between those two dusts. There 
should be orders of magnitude of differ-
ence between the Pr(i, thermal) values 
for those cases, yet the linear depen-
dence gives only factors of two. 
The linear relationship is thus not 
just arbitrary; it grossly underestimates 
the importance of the temperature vari-
able. A more sensitive function of tem-
perature is needed, and the logical 
choice is an exponential one. However, 
even with a more sensitive temperature 
function, an important point would still 
be missing if the Tml n for Pittsburgh 
coal were retained as the standard by 
which other autoignition temperatures 
were evaluated. It is not the auto-
ignition temperature relative to that of 
some other dust that is important in 
estimating the probability of thermal 
autotgnition. The critical parameter in 
estimating Pdi, thermal) is the auto-
ignition temperature relative to the 
opepating temperature of the dust-bearing 
system, or to the temperature extpemeB to 
which the system may be subjected. The 
critical factor in determining Pt(i, 
thermal) is the fraction of time the 
dust-bearing system operates at tempera-
tures that approach or exceed the auto-
ignition temperatures. If the time dis-
tribution function were known precisely, 
and if the system were spatially iso-
thermal and contained dispersed dust at 
concentrations much higher than CL, then 
Pr(i, thermal) could be determined quan-
titatively. The explosion frequency 
would then be equal to the ignition fre-
quency, and would be given by the 
frequency at which the operating tempera-
ture, To, exceeded the autoignition tem-
perature, Tml n' Realistically, however, 
the operating dust-bearing systems are 
not isothermal, nor is the fraction of 
time that the system operates at or near 
Tml n really known. Even with those 
uncertainties, the critical parameter 
is not the ratio, (Tml n) Pittsburgh 
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coal/(Tmln)dust; instead, it is the tem-
perature difference, Tmln - To. 
In the following section, a method will 
be proposed for using that temperature 
difference, Tml n - To, for evaluating the 
probability of thermal autoignition. 
In this section, the critique of the 
old index continues with a detailed con-
sideration of the deficiencies in the 
second parameter, equation 2. The second 
parameter, the explosion severity, was 
defined in terms of the product of the 
maximum explosion pressure, Pmax, with 
the maximum rate of pressure rise 
(dp/dt)max' Those quantities were mea-
sured in the closed 1-L Hartmann chamber 
at a fixed dust concentration (~). The 
major deficiency of the second parameter 
is the unjustified assumption that the 
"severity" of an actual explosion can 
realistically be related to measurements 
in small-scale laboratory systems that 
focus exclusively on the intrinsic spher-
ical combustion rate of the dust under 
constant volume conditions. The over-
whelming weight of evidence shows clearly 
that the real "severity" of an actual 
explosion cannot be predicted accurately 
by such simplified measurements. Other 
factors such as boundary constants, 
initial conditions, and the flow dynamics 
that develop during the course' of an ex-
plosion are s~ critical that they can be 
overwhelming in determining the severity 
of an explosion (26). The data used to 
obtain an evaluation according to equa-
tion 2 ignore these critical factors. 
The intr~nsic flammability properties of 
a dust play an important role in deter-
mining whether or not an explosion is 
possible and in determining the prelimi-
nary rate of flame propagation near the 
ignition source; however, once the pro-
cess starts, the severity of the resul-
tant explosion is controlled by other 
factors. These factors are the boundary 
constraint and initial conditions that 
determine the flow dynamics and the re-
sultant turbulence interactions. They 
are controlled by the size and shape of 
the flammable volume; its size and shape 
relative to that of the enclosure, the 
location of the ignition point relative 
to the boundaries, the condition of 
the boundaries (open or closed), the 
.1" 
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geometric structure of internal obstruc-
tions, and the initial turbulence inten-
sity and the opportunity for the gen-
eration of turbulence by aerodynamic 
interactions developing during the course 
of the explosion (~). 
A simple example of how such factors 
influence the severity of a real explo-
sion is illustrated by some recent ex-
periments performed at the Bruceton Lake 
Lynn Laboratory. A fixed volume of the 
mine entry was isolated with a plastic 
diaphragm at a distance of 27 ft from 
the mine face (closed end). The initial 
volume (so isolated) was 7 ft high by 
22 ft wide by 27 ft long (118 m3 ) and was 
filled with a 7.55 pct methane-air mix-
ture. The same volume and mixture were 
ignited at three different locations: at 
a closed end (the face), in the center of 
the flammable volume, and at the open end 
(near the plastic diaphragm, which rup-
tures readily after ignition). The three 
different results are shown in table 1, 
where they are also compared with labora-
tory scale data for spherical propagation 
for the same mixture in a fixed, 20-L 
volume. The maximum pressures measured 
in the mine experiments have no relation-
ship to the Pmax value measured in the 
20-L system at constant volume. For the 
mine case, there is an outward expansion 
toward the open end that can relieve the 
developing pressure, and all the mine 
data show lower pressures than are ob-
served at constant volume. However, the 
three mine experiments show a marked sen-
sitivity to the location of the ignition 
source. For ignition at the closed end, 
the explosion is much more severe than 
for ignition at the open end. For 
closed-end ignition, turbulence develops 
in the unburned gas motion ahead of the 
flame and causes a rapid flame accelera-
tion. The maximum flame speed is almost 
two orders of magnitudes higher for 
closed-end ignition. The constant vol-
ume, 20-L data grossly overestimated the 
maximum pressure, grossly underestimated 
the flame speed, and gave no information 
on the sensitivity to ignition location, 
boundary constraints, and the dynamic ef-
fects of turbulence. If the flammable 
volume had been longer than 27 ft, and if 
periodic obstructions had been placed in 
the mine, flame velocities would have 
reached supersonic speeds and explosion 
pressures would have exceeded 7.2 bars, 
even if the system were free to expand. 
The 20-L measurements provide no informa-
tion on those factors critical to the ex-
plosion's real severity. 
Next, consider the Pmax factor in equa-
tion 2. To what extent does Pmax, by 
itself, measured in a constant volume 
system, control the severity of an explo-
sion? For the more flammable dusts, Pmax 
will generally be in the range of 6 to 10 
bars; that is, if the system is initially 
at 1 bar (1 atm), explosions in a fixed 
volume will generate overpressures of 
from 5 to 9 bars (74 to 118 psig). For 
TABLE 1. - Flame propagation characteristics for CH4-air 
explosions (7.55 pet) at Lake Lynn for various 
ignition locations compared with 20 L data 
- Test system and Maximum Flame speed, 
ignition location overpressure, m/s 
bar max 
Lake Lynn: 
Closed end or face •• 0.48 168 
Center •••••••••••••• .27 
Open end diaphragm ••• .14 4 
Constant volume, 
20 L, center •••••••• 7.2 3 
Kst size-normalized rate of pressure rise. 
aOutward. 
blnward. 
av 
34 
32 8 
3b 
4 
1. 5 
(dp/dt)max, Ks t, 
barfs bar m/s 
3.3 15.7 
1.7 8.1 
.02 .1 
129 35 
• 
dusts that are barely flammable, explo-
sion pressures will be in the 3 to 4 bar 
range. Those values are for concentra-
tions of dust that are well within the 
domain of flammability. As the limits of 
flammability are approached, the explo-
sion overpressures drop almost discontin-
uously to zero. Thus, nonexplosive dusts 
or explosive dusts at concentrations 
below their lean limits, show no explo-
sion overpressures. Furthermore, for 
spherical flame propagation in a constant 
volume system that is ignited centrally, 
heat losses are low and measured explo-
sion pressures generally approach those 
calculated on the basis of adiabatic 
equilibrium for constant volume combus-
tion. Beyond the flammability limit, 
however, measured explosion overpressures 
are near zero even though adiabatic 
eq ui li br'ium condi tions would generate 
overpressure in the 3 to 4 bar range. 
Therefore, the lean limit concentration, 
el, is a very important parameter since 
it is the dividing line between high ex-
plosion pressures at higher concentra-
tions and insignificant overpressures at 
lower concentrations. But, when conduct-
ing experiments above Cl with explosive 
dust concentrations, is it important to 
distinguish between the case where the 
overpressure is 3 atm and where it is 8 
atm? The answer depends on the purpose 
or use of the Pmax factor. For the nor-
mal external structures of interest, such 
as the walls of a factory, the roof of a 
facility, the windows of a habltat, or 
even the concrete of a storage silo, the 
answer is that it makes little difference 
whether the overpressure is 3 or 8 atm. 
Structural failure will occur catastroph-
ically in either case, and at much lower 
overpressures. Such structural failure 
opens the system to the surroundings and 
causes the venting of expanding explosion 
gases, both burned and unburned. In such 
cases, the Pmax value measured in spheri-
cal, constant volume combustion, is gen-
erally not attained in reality. The se-
verity of such a real-world explosion and 
the damage it causes is unrelated to the 
measured Pmax value at constant volume, 
but it is determined by the rupture pres-
sure of the structure, the vent area, the 
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dynamics of pressure development, and 
the flow dynamics of pressure relief. In 
fact, the strategy for explosion protec-
tion in such structures encourages their 
failure in a controlled manner at very 
low overpressures (~). That is achieved 
by using a large vent area, which opens 
at a relatively low overpressure. In 
such cases, the important parameter in 
determining the maximum pressure within 
the structure is (dp!dt)max, as well as 
the vent area, and the aerodynamic and 
geometric factors mentioned earlier. In 
such cases, the Pmax value measured in 
a constant volume sphere is virtually 
irrelevant. 
On the other hand, if some of the in-
ternal plant equipment, pulverizers, 
dryers, reactors, or pneumatic feed lines 
can be designed to withstand and contain 
explosions, then clearly Pmax is the cri-
tical factor. For that purpose Pmax is 
critical; however, (dp!dt)max then be-
comes virtually irrelevent. 
To summarize, while Pmax is an impor-
tant factor in the potential severity of 
an explosion since it measures the maxi-
mum explosion stress to which process 
equipment will be subjected, and is 
therefore, the critical factor in design-
ing such equipment to contain or with-
stand explosions, the same Pmax factor is 
not a realistic measure of the explosion 
severity or damage potential to external 
structures such as walls, silos, roofs, 
doors, or windows. In those latter 
cases, catastrophic failure results from 
even the mildest explosion pressures and 
the important factor is not Pmax, but 
(dp!dt)max' Thus, either the one parame-
ter or the other is important depending 
on the purpose or use intended, and the 
mixing of the two quantities into a 
single severity index is inappropriate. 
Furthermore, for the occupants of a 
plant or facillty, if the flammable vol-
ume is a significant fraction of the 
plant volume, even the mildest explosion 
is not a survivable event. From their 
viewpOint, the absolute magnitude of Pmax 
is irrelevant and even the value of 
(dp!dt)ma*, which may be used to protect 
the external structure, may also be 
entirely irrelevant to their survival. 
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PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As indicated in the previous section, 
the intrinsic flammability properties of 
a dust do not by themselves uniquely de-
termine the severity of an explosion. 
Nevertheless, previous considerations do 
indicate that intrinsic flammability 
properties have a profound influence on 
the probability of the occurrence of an 
explosion, quite apart from the question 
of its severity. How direct is the rela-
tionship between the intrinsic combustion 
behavior of the dust and the probability 
of the occurrence of an explosion in a 
dust-bearing system? A direct relation-
ship is suggested because, if a dust is 
entirely noncombustible, the explosion 
probability is nil. If a dust cannot 
undergo an exothermic combustion reaction 
in air, then it does not have a finite 
lean limit concentration. In that case 
Pr(f) = 0, which means that the explosion 
probability is zero regardless of the 
dusts dispersibility or the presence of 
ignition sources. Examples of such dusts 
are limestone, fly ash, cement, alumina, 
silica, clay, or talc. For such dusts CL 
= 00, hence Pr(f) = 0, and Pr(expl) = O. 
Dusts that are capable of undergoing an 
exothermic reaction in air (at a suffi-
ciently rapid rate) such as coal, flour, 
wood, plastic, aluminum, or zirconium, 
have finite lean limit concentrations. 
Common sense thus suggests a simple in-
verse relationship between Pr(f) and CL. 
The lower the lean limit concentration, 
the easier it will be for a given source 
of dust to generate that minimum concen-
tration, and the higher will be Pr(f). 
In general, all dusts will have a finite 
dispersion probability, Pr(d). Such 
flammable dusts also have finite auto-
ignition temperatures and finite ignition 
probabilities. Accordingly, there is a 
finite hazard involved in their mining, 
manufacture, transport, storage, and use. 
This section will present some examples 
of actual evaluations of the hazard. 
ACTUAL EVALUATIONS 
The net explosion probability, equa-
tion 4, was previously expressed in 
terms of the product of three separate 
probabilities; Pr(d), Pr(f), and Pr(i). 
It was implicitly assumed that the events 
or conditions determining each of those 
probabilities were mutually independent 
of one another. In that case, the events 
or conditions that determine each proba-
bility are randomly distributed in time, 
with respect to one another. Each proba-
bility was defined in terms of the frac-
tion of time the system existed in a 
state in which those separate events or 
conditions were present. Pr(d) was the 
fraction of time the dust was dIspersed; 
Pr(f) was the fraction of time a flam-
mable concentration was present, and 
Pr(i) was the fraction of time an effec-
tive ignition source was present. The 
requirement of mutual independence for 
each of these probabilities does not mean 
that the events that determine anyone 
probability must themselves be randomly 
distributed in time, but only that 
they have a random relationship to the 
events that determine the other two 
probabilities. 
Examples A and B: Dust 
rollector Baghouse 
I 
Consider ta filter bag dust collector 
that is pe ~odically cleaned every hour 
by a reverse' pressure pulse, which gener-
ates a flammable dust cloud that is air-
borne for 3 min before the dust settles 
by gravity to the bottom of the system 
where it is removed by a rotary feeder. 
In that system, Pr(d) = 3/60 = 0.05. The 
cleaning pulses, which generate the 
finite value of Pr(d), are quite periodic 
and not at all randomly distributed in 
time. But that, by itself, says nothing 
about its mutual independence with re-
spect to either one of the other proba-
bilities. If the events that may cause 
the presence of an ignition source in the 
baghouse volume are randomly distributed 
with respect to the pulse cleaning peri-
od, then Pr(i) and Pr(d) would be mutual-
ly independent of one another. Such 
would be the case, for example, if the 
only ignition source possible were hot 
embers from an upstream grinder. Assume 
that such an ignition source was present 
g 
only once a month, on the average. Fur-
thermore, assume that these embers cooled 
rapidly so that they were hot enough to 
ignite the dispersed dust for a short 
time interval of only 10 s. In that 
case, Pr(i) 10/(60)(60)(24)(30) = 3.9 
x 10- 6 • The events governing those two 
probabilities are mutually independent of 
one another. As a result~ the net proba-
bility of both dispersion and ignition 
occurring at the same time would 
be Pr(d)Pr(i) (0.05)(3.9 x 10- 6 ) = 2 
x 10- 7 • 
If, however, that same dust was easily 
ignited by an electrostatic spark dis-
charge, which was always triggered by the 
reverse air pulse, then the two probabil-
ities would no longer be mutually inde-
pendent. If that spark discharge lasted 
only 10 ~s, then at a cleaning rate of 
once per hour, it could be calculated 
that Pr(i) = 10- 5/(60)(60) = 2.8 x 10- 9 • 
However, since the dispersion and igni-
tion events are now not mutually indepen-
dent of one another, it would be incor-
rect to estimate the net probability of 
dispersion and ignition occurring at the 
same time as being (.05)(2.8 x 10- 9 ) 
= 1.4 x 10- 1°. That would grossly under-
estimate the hazard because the ignition 
and dispersion events are not randomly 
distributed with respect to one another. 
According to our assumption, they are 
precisely correlated in time. Since the 
ignition source is present when disper-
sion occurs, the correct value for the 
product of the two probabilities is 
therefore Pr(d)Pr(i) = Pr(d,i) = 0.05. 
To estimate Pr(expl) for the above two 
cases of the randomly present embers or 
the electrostatic spark associated with 
the cleaning pulse, it is necessary to 
know Pr(f). Since pr(f) is defined in 
terms of the nominal loading and since it 
is assumed that a flammable dust concen-
tration is present at each pulse cleaning 
event, Pr(f) = 1. In the case of the hot 
embers, therefore, Pr(expl) = 2 x 10- 7• 
In the case of the electrostatic dis-
charge, Pr(expl) = 0.05. The coupled 
electrostatic case is much more hazardous 
even though its individual, randomized 
ignition probability, Pr(i), was much 
lower than for the hot embers ignition 
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source, since the spark lasted for a much 
shorter time period. 
But, even after the calculation is made 
according to equation 4, the problem of 
interpretation remains. Hhat is the 
practical meaning of an explosion proba-
bility of 2 x 10- 71 Equation 4, as pre-
sented, does not yet have a clear-cut 
physical interpretation. From the view-
point of predicting explosion hazards, it 
is not the dimensionless probability that 
is needed, but rather the predicted fre-
quency of occurrence of an explosion. 
The explosion frequency quantifies the 
hazard in a physically meaningful form. 
For an explosion frequency prediction, 
only two of the three conditions should 
be expressed as probabi lit ies, and the 
third should be expressed in terms of its 
frequency of occurrence. Thus, for the 
first case of ignition by hot embers: 
f(expl) = Pr(f)Pr(d)f(i), where f(1) is 
now the frequency of the presence of the 
hot ember ignition source within the dust 
collector. In this case, the presence of 
the ignition source was the least fre-
quent of the three events that determIne 
the three probRbllities, and hence it was 
chosen as the third factor, which is ex-
pressed in terms of frequency. For the 
assumptions made earlier, Pr(f) = 1, and 
Pr(d) = Talrborne/Tpulse, where Talrborne 
is the duration of the time the dust is 
airborne and Tpulse 
dispersion pulses. 
ember case, f(expl) 
is the period between 
Thus, for the hot 
= (1)(3 min/60 min) 
1 1 h = 0.05 per month 
mont 0.60 per year. 
The explosion frequency of 0.60 per year 
corresponds to a predicted period of one 
explosion every 1.7 years,on the average. 
For the second case in which dispersion 
and ignition events are precisely corre-
lated in time, the duration of the igni-
tion source and the duration of time that 
the dust is airborne are both irrevelent. 
Since an affective ignition source is al-
ways present during the dispersion, Pr(i) 
= 1 and f(expl) = Pr(f) Pr(d)f(d) = (1)(1) 
1 (1 hour) = 1 per hour. An explosion will 
occur at each pulse cleaning operation, 
and the filter bag-house could never op-
erate successfully in reality. 
I' 
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These specific examples were presented 
for illustrative purposes only. They 
should not be considered as real evalua-
tions of a particular explosion hazard. 
With the exception of some special 
plastic and chemical dusts, the electro-
static ignition of most common dusts is 
highly improbable under most circum-
stances, so that the second case is some-
what fictitious. In the former case of 
hot embers, the real hazard has been 
underestimated by the above calculation 
because it has ignored the fire hazard 
and the potential for such a fire to lead 
to a subsequent explosion. The analysis 
assumed that for an explosion to occur, 
the presence of the random hot embers 
would have to overlap in time with the 
pulse cleaning duration during which the 
dust was airborne for only 3 min once 
every hour. However, regardless of when 
the embers appeared in the pulse cleaning 
cycle, they would still be collected on a 
filter bag, and could readily generate a 
smoldering fire in the accumulated dust 
even if that dust is not being dispersed. 
Such a fire could then lead to an explo-
sion during the next cleaning cycle. 
The above calculations were designed to 
illustrate some of the complexities and 
pitfalls involved in obtaining realistic 
hazard evaluations. A cautious approach 
must be taken: the complicated inter-
relationships between the various pro-
cesses and events involved must be fully 
understood, and any evaluation should 
clearly emphasize the limitations and 
uncertainties involved in any hazard 
evaluation or forecast. 
EX'!!llJ?.~es C _~~~eumatic Dust 
Transport System 
In a simpler example, for a relatively 
dilute dust-bearing system in which a 
predispersed dust concentration above the 
lean limit concentration is present for 
only 1 pct of the time, Pdf) = 0.010. 
Let the dispersion be continuous so that 
Pr(d) = 1. Consider, as before, an ef-
fective ignition source whose duration is 
very short compared to the duration of 
those concentration fluctuations or their 
period. Let that ignition source be 
present at a frequency of once per year. 
For that system, the explosion frequency 
is simply: f(expl) Pr(d)Pr(f)f(i) 
1 
= 10- 2 per year. The yr = (1)(0.01) 
explosion period is therefore one ex-
plosion every 100 yr. If, instead, the 
dust concentration were continuously 
maintained at a concentration above the 
lean limit, then Pr(f) = 1 and f(expl) 
= (l)(l)f(i) = 1 per year. The explosion 
frequency would be equal to the ignition 
frequency and would correspond to a pe-
riod of one one explosion per year. 
In these rather simplified examples, 
there appears to be some arbitrariness in 
the choice of the ignition event as the 
discrete event, which is expressed in 
terms of its frequency, f(i). The other 
two conditions or events were expressed 
in terms of their fractional time dura-
tion, or probabilities Pr(d) and Pr(f). 
The choice is, however, not really arbi-
trary. The least frequent event, or the 
event with the smallest time duration, 
should be chosen as the discrete one. 
rr, for example, in the system just con-
sidered the ignition probability was the 
larger one so that the ignition source 
was present for 1 pct of the time, then 
Pr(i) = 0.01. If the dust were pre-
dispersed but a lean limit concentration 
was randomly exceeded at a frequency of 
only once every 6 months, then f(expl) 
1 Pr(d)Pr(i)f(f) = (1)(0.01) 0 5 
• years 
= 2 x 10- 2 per year. The expected explo-
sion period would then be the reciprocal 
of f(expl), or one explosion every 50 yr. 
Since the existence of the flammable vol-
ume is the rarer event, it was chosen to 
be expressed in terms of its frequency of 
occurrence. It is an implicit assumption 
in the calculation that the events in 
question must be random related to one 
another, as discussed earlier. 
Example E: Grain Storage Facility 
Let us consider still another specific 
example: a dusty grain storage facility 
containing a nominal dust loading on the 
&2 
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floor of the conveyor belt run that is 
sufficient to generate a flammable dust 
cloud if it were dispersed within the 
passageway containing the conveyor belt. 
If no care is taken to remove the accumu-
lated dust, it would be present almost 
continuously, so that Pr(f) = 1. Consid-
er an unshielded space-heater installed 
within the conveyor run passageway. The 
heater is usually operated only during 
the coldest months. Assume that the sur-
face temperature of its heating elements 
reaches the hot surface ignition tempera-
ture of the grain dust cloud for, on the 
average, 5 pct of the time. The heater 
is not in direct contact with the dUst 
accumulation on the floor, but is several 
feet above the floor. For that ignition 
source, Pr(i) = 0.05. In this case, it 
is the dispersion of the dust into the 
air that is the least probable event and 
hence it is treated as the discrete event 
that is "rate limiting." If some aero-
dynamic disturbance capable of dispersing 
the dust cloud into the heater is pres-
ent, on the average of approximately once 
in 9 months, and if those disturbances 
are randomly distributed with respect 
to the operation of the space heater, 
then f(exp1) = Pr(f)Pr(i)f(d) = (1)(0.05) 
1 o 75 = 0.067 per year, and the aver-
• year 
age period of an explosion occurrence 
would be once every 15 yr. The offending 
aerodynamic disturbance could be an in-
tense starting surge of the conveyor 
belt, a ruptured compressed air line, an 
object falling on the dusty floor, or an 
exceptionally strong wind gust through an 
open door or window. 
In such instances, conventional wisdom 
generally attributes the cause of the ex-
plosion to the event that has the lowest 
frequency. If the conveyor belt passage-
way just considered were continually 
observed, the explosion would not happen 
until the aerodynamic disturbance gen-
erates a dust cloud. Hence, conventional 
wisdom would attribute the "cause" of the 
explosion to that event which preceded it 
most directly in time. Even though an 
effective ignition source was present 5 
pct of the time, and an explosive dust 
loading was present 100 pct of the time, 
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the explosion did not occur until the 
dust was dispersed. The instant the dust 
was dispersed, the explosion occurred; 
hence, it is considered by conventional 
wisdom to be the cause. 
In the earlier cases considered, in 
which the ignition event was the least 
frequent one, conventional wisdom would 
say that the explosion was caused by the 
hot embers, or the electrostatic spark, 
or whatever else may have been determined 
to be the ignition source. However, in 
many accidents involving fuels that can 
be readily ignited, the offending igni-
tion source may be impossible to ftnd. 
Conventional wisdom thus overemphasizes 
the importance of the ignition source, 
and if this is done to the exclusion of 
the other factors, it often leads to the 
unproductive approach of trying to ex-
clude all possible sources of ignition in 
a system, when, in fact, that may be the 
least productive approach to prevention. 
Conventional wisdom is incorrect in 
emphasizing the least frequent of the 
events or conditions as the cause of the 
explosion. The least frequent event does 
indeed trigger the explosion, and because 
it immediately precedes the dramatic ex-
plosion event, there is inevitably a sub-
jective temptation to say that it was 
therefore the cause of the explosion. 
But, if forced to choose a single cause 
for the explosion, it is more correct to 
attribute it to the offending condition 
or event with the highest frequency or 
probability, rather than to the one with 
the lowest. For the case of the grain 
storage facility just considered, it was 
the accumulation of a flammable dust 
loading that was the major cause, since 
Pr(f) was unity. The ignition source was 
the next most significant cause since 
pdi) = 0.05. Although the aerodynamic 
disturbance triggered the explosion, its 
occurrence would have been of trivial 
significance in the absence of the other 
two conditions. It is more logical to 
consider the dust dispersion event as the 
least significant of the three factors. 
Conventional wisdom overemphasizes the 
final event at the expense of the entire 
chain of precipitating events. 
1'1 
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CORRELATION OF EVENTS AND RANDOMNESS 
As indicated earlier, in cases where 
the individual events that determine each 
of the three probabilities (or frequen-
cies) are not randomly distributed with 
respect to one another, they cannot be 
considered mutually independent, and 
equation 4 cannot be used directly. If 
time correlations are present between the 
events involved, there may be a rein-
forcement of the hazard if the time cor-
relations are such that the events tend 
to occur in phase. ·On the other hand, 
there may be a diminution of the hazard 
if the events occur out of phase. For 
example, in the case of the grain storage 
facility just considered, the space 
heater ignition source is more likely to 
be on during the winter months when the 
grain dust is drier. A drier grain dust 
has a lower lean limit concentration, a 
lower thermal ignition temperature, and a 
greater dispersibility in a given aero-
dynamic disturbance. A drier grain also 
has a higher rate of dust generation per 
unit mass of grain transported along the 
conveyor. Such correlations in these ef-
fects will tend to increase the hazard 
and give an explosion frequency higher 
than that estimated on the basis of 
randomness. 
Proper safety practices will, in fact, 
attempt to reduce explosion hazards by a 
purposeful suppression of randomness. 
Consider, for example, a coal pulverizer 
and dust transport system to a coal dust 
burner or kiln in which air is used as 
the dUst transport medium. For typical 
flows of coal and air, concentrations are 
well above the lean limit under normal 
operating conditions, and the dust is 
predispersed. Thus Pr(d) == 1 and Pr(f) 
== 1 in the pneumatic transport system 
that grinds the coal dust and feeds it to 
the burner. A welding torch is an effec-
tive ignition source for the coal dust-
air mixture, and if it were known that 
such an effective ignition source would 
be present in the system once every 
6 months, a slavish adherence to our 
previous formula would give the erroneous 
results that f(expl) = Pr(d)Pr(f)f(i) 
1 
== (1)(1) 0.5 year 2 per = year. Of 
course, the explosion frequency is not 
two explosions per year because the pres-
ence of the welding torch within the sys-
tem is not a random event. The torch is 
used for internal repair and maintenance 
of the system and proper safety rules re-
quire that the system be shut down and 
the coal dust removed before any welding 
operations begin. Safe maintenance and 
repair require a purposeful ordering of 
events, so that Pr(d) = 0 and Pr(f) == 0 
during the same time intervals that Pr(i) 
== 1. The events in the system are clear-
ly not randomly distributed with respect 
to one another, and Pr(expl) will remain 
zero regardless of the repair frequency. 
If the events involved are not randomly 
distributed in time, then the probabil-
ities must be considered in terms of the 
simultaneity of the events or their lack 
thereof. In the above case of welding, 
to obtain a correct estimate, f(i) is not 
simply the average frequency of occur-
rence of an ignicion source, but is its 
frequency of occurrence during the times 
that Pr(d)Pr(f) = 1. The simultaneous 
presence of all three conditions deter-
mine the explosion frequency. The system 
is safe as long as the "lockout" proce-
dure is followed; namely, as long as 
there is never an overlap in the time 
intervals that Pr(d)Pr(f) and Pr(i) are 
simultaneously unity. 
In the above welding case, the lack of 
randomness is purposeful; it is arranged 
by the system operator in order to mini-
mize the explosion hazard. However, 
there are other instances where the 
events themselves are fortuitously and 
unfortunately "malevolent"; that is, they 
exhibit a time correlation or simultane-
ity that reinforces or magnifies the ex-
plosion hazard. A good example of such. 
malevolent simultaneity is the "gas igni-
tion" problem near the face of a coal 
mine. Consider a coal mine that contains 
a nominal loading of coal dust on the 
floor, ribs, and roof that would be flam-
mable if it were dispersed within the 
mine entry. For that mine, Pr(f) = 1. 
Such a situation is now forbidden in coal 
mines by law (20-~); however, it was the 
rule, rather than the exception, near the 
turn of this century. Assume that the 
mine in question generates sufficient 
methane so that it has a significant face 
igni tion frequency. The term "face ig-
nitIon" describes a smaller scale methane 
gas explosion that is limIted to a small 
flammable volume near the mining machine. 
It is usually initiated by the frictional 
heating of hard inclusions when they are 
struck by the bits of a continuous miner 
(28). The source intensity of such an 
ignition is suffIcient to ignite a dis-
persed coal dust-air mixture. Let the 
average frequency of occurrence of such a 
face ignition be f(i) = 5 per year. The 
dust in a coal mine is accum1ated on sur-
faces and is not normally predispersed. 
It could logically be argued that the ex-
plosion frequency would then still be 
controlled by the dispersion probability 
Pr(d), so that f(exp1) Pr(f)Pr(d)f(i) 
= (1)Pr(d)(5 per year). Or, if disper-
sion were the least frequent event and 
the face ignition lasted for approximate-
ly 2 s, it could be argued that f(exp1) 
Pr(f)Pr(i)f(d) (1)[5 x 2/(3,600) 
(24)(365)]f(d) = 3.2 x 10- 7f(d), where 
fed) is the frequency of dust dispersion. 
However, in the case of face ignition, 
the ignition event is not randomly dis-
tributed with respect to the dispersion 
event. The same face ignition event that 
is capable of igniting a dispersed dust 
cloud also provides the aerodynamic dis-
turbance that is usually sufficient to 
disperse the dust accumulations. Thus, 
ignition and dispersion occur at essen-
tially the same instant in time. Ths si-
multaneity of dispersion and ignition 
means that the frequency of 5 per year is 
not just a measure of f(i), but also of 
the products Pr(d)f(i) Pr(i)f(d). 
Hence, the explosion frequency is f(exp1) 
= 5 per year, and is equal to the igni-
tion (and dispersion) frequency. The 
hazard is thus markedly increased by the 
fact that the methane ignition process 
was also an effective dispersion 
process. 
By contrast, some other ignition source 
that does not generate a simultaneous 
aerodynamic disturbance is far less 
hazardous; for example, a welder's torch 
or a trolley wire arc, either of which 
would be effective in igniting coal dust 
and might have the identical frequency of 
occurrence as the face ignition ( 5 per 
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year). If the welders torch were used 
for 1 h at a frequency of five times per 
year, then Pr(i) = (5 x 1 hour/(24)(365) 
hours) = 5.7 x 10- 4 • Now consider an 
independent dispersion process, which 
is randomly distributed in time relative 
to the ignition source, but with the 
same frequency as before (5 aerodynamic 
disturbances per year). Now the pre-
dicted explosion frequency is f(expl) 
= Pr(f)Pr(i)f(d) = (1)(5.7 x 10- 4 ) 5 per 
year 0.0029 per year. For this case, 
where the same frequency of dispersion 
and ignition events are present, but where 
they are pandomly distributed in time se-
quence, the explosion frequency has been 
reduced by over three orders of magni-
tude. From an unacceptable explosion 
period of one explosion every 2.4 months, 
it has been reduced to a less intolerable 
level of one every 350 yrt 
Near the turn of the century, there was 
a misapprehension that coal dust by it-
self was not explosive. It was argued 
that the frequent disasters in coal mines 
were caused entirely by methane gas. So 
prevalent was that mistaken belief that 
loose coal dust in the mines was rou-
tinely used to pack or "stem" explosives 
in their boreholes. The explosives used 
at that time were readily capable of ig-
niting coal dust, which explains the high 
explosion disaster rate in coal mines 
during that period. Those exceedingly 
hazardous blasting practices insured that 
pdd) , Pdf), and Pdt) were intimately 
coupled and correlated in phase so that 
they reached their peaks simultaneously 
in time. 
The simultaneity of ignition and dis-
persion processes characterizes most ac-
cidental dust explosion processes. The 
burned gases generated by the dust ex-
plosion expand rapidly from the ignition 
source and push the still unburned gases 
outward. That aerodynamic disturbance 
disperses the dust ahead of the flame 
front and also markedly increases the 
Reynolds number of the flow ahead of the 
flame. The flow ahead of the flame 
becomes turbulent and as the flame prop-
agates into the turbulent flow, it ac-
celerates markedly. That turbulent flame 
front acceleration increases the unburned 
mixture flow velocity, which further 
r 
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increases the turbulence intensity, 
thereby increasing the dust dispersion 
and further accelerating the flame. This 
self-accelerating process generates high 
pressures even in the absence of signifi-
cant geometric confinement (~). 
Such dust explosions are actually 
secondary explosions (~) that are quite 
common in mines, factories, grain storage 
facilities, or pulverized coal-firing 
systems. The secondary explosions are 
:f.nitiated by primary explosions of gas or 
dust. The primary explosion generates 
flows that vent into dusty spaces from 
adjacent regions or process equipment. 
Secondary explosion events are examples 
o~ a magnification of the hazard when ig-
nition and dispersion processes are not 
randomly distributed in time, but are 
intimately coupled in the same pro-
cess. For most secondary explosions, the 
additional turbulence, which further 
reinforces the dispersion and flame ac-
celeration, magnifies the hazard. As 
previously indicated, it is the complex 
dynamics of such processes that ulti-
mately determine the real severity of an 
industrial dust explosion. Such pro-
cesses are not accurately simulated in 
laboratory-scale, spherical flames at 
constant volume. 
PROPOSED METHOD FOR EVALUATING 
Pr(i, thermal) 
As indicated in an earlier section, 
which enumerated the deficiencies of the 
old explosibility index (equation 3), the 
use of the linear ratio (Tmin)Pittsburgh 
coal/(Tmln)dust in its ignition sensi-
tivity parameter (equation 2) grossly un-
derestimated the importance of the tem-
perature variable. In addition, it was 
shown that the important variable in 
estimating the probability of thermal 
ignition was not the ratio of a dust's 
autoignition temperature Tmin relative to 
that of s9me other dust, but rather the 
difference between its autoignition tem-
perature and the operating tempera-
ture. The demonstrated need for a more 
sensitive, exponential fUnction to re-
late Pr(i) to Tml n, and the choice of 
(Tmin - To) as the important temperature 
variable leads to a very familiar func-
tional form for Prei, thermal), Safety 
engineers in a plant or factory will gen-
erally not have a precise knowledge of 
the fraction of time a dust-bearing sys-
tem spends at each temperature. There 
are inevitable statistical and opera-
tional fluctuations in the system temper-
atures that are associated with startup 
and shutdown transients; for example, 
emergency trips of the system, variation 
in the properties of the material feed, 
and seasonal variations of ambient tem-
perature and humidity. The problem of 
determining the fraction of time that the 
system's temperature (or internal energy) 
will exceed the critical level for igni-
tion is mathematically analogous to the 
well-known problem of statistical mechan-
ics: determining the fraction of parti-
cles in a gas, at a temperature T, whose 
energy exceeds some critical level l;r. 
That fraction is given by the Boltzmann 
distribution function, exp( -l; IIkT) , ,.vhere 
the quantity, k, is a universal constant 
relating the kinetic energy or momentum 
of atomic particles (reflected in the 
pressure they exert on their surround-
ings) to the temperature of the system. 
Naturally, the statistics that determine 
the temperature fluctuations in a given 
apparatus or dust-bearing system are less 
predictable than those involved in the 
random motions of gas molecules exchang-
ing kinetic energy by impact. Clearly, a 
different constant is required for the 
dust-bearing system, and its value cannot 
be predicted, a priori, nor would the 
constant determined for one dust-bearing 
system be applicable to another system of 
different structure or design. With that 
limitation, it seems plaus~ble to esti-
mate the small population of thermally 
autoignitable states by an analogous 
function: 
Pr(i, thermal) 
exp [-C (Tml n - To(t»/To(t)] (5), 
where C is some macroscopic facility con-
stant to be determined by the operating 
characteristics of a given dust-bearing 
system. 
The time-average operating temperature, 
To(t), is naturally constrained to be 
less than the autoignition temperature, 
Tmlno For those time intervals in which 
transient temperature excursions exceed 
Tml n' Pr(i, thermal) becomes unity and 
explosion is certain if the dust is dis-
persed at a flammable concentration. 
Normally, To(t) <Tml n, and the explosion 
probability is small. With the proper 
choice of the constant C, Pr(i, thermal) 
should represent the fraction of time 
that the system would accidentally ex-
perience a temperature excursion that 
would lead to ignition. The choice of a 
realistic proportionality constant would 
require a detailed measurement of the 
operating temperatures within the dust-
bearing system. Once a particular dust 
is specified for the system, Tmln is 
determined. The operator or designer of 
the equipment then has some control over 
To(t) and the constant C. For safe oper-
ation, the constant C should be as large 
as possible, and To(t) as low as 
possible. 
One final point relates to the copres-
ence of other types of energy sources in 
the system: electrical or chemical. As 
formulated, in the preceding development 
Pr(i, thermal) is the purely thermal 
autoignition probability. The copresence 
of other types of ignition sources would 
magnify the total ignition probability 
considerably. Increasing the operation 
temperature of a system markedly reduces 
the minimum spark ignition energy (12-
13). For example, at a coal dust concen-
tration of 400 g/m3 , increasing the 
initial temperature from 25° to 200 0 C 
results in an order of magnitude reduc-
tion in the Emln-value. That reduction 
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in the minimum spark ignition energy 
could take the system from a condition in 
which spark ignition is virtually impos-
sible at 25 0 C to one in which the spark 
ignition probability Pr(i, spark) becomes 
significant during the operating life of 
the facility. The minimum AIT value for 
Pittsburgh coal is near 540 0 C, so that 
the difference, Tmln - To(t), would still 
be quite large even if the operating tem-
perature is raised from 25 0 to 200 0 C. 
Now if the dust-bearing system were 
well controlled at 200 0 C so that the 
temperature excursions about To(t) were 
small in magnitude, the constant C would 
be large, and the purely thermal auto-
ignition probability would be quite low 
even at To(t) = 200 0 C. However, if the 
spark ignition probability, Pr(i, spark) 
is enhanced by that temperature increase, 
the hazard is magnified. Thus, the ther-
mal autoignition probability may still be 
trivial in going from 25 0 to 200 0 C, but 
that increase in operating temperature 
may have a profound effect on Pr(i, 
spark). There is a strong synergism be-
tween the thermal energy content and the 
spark ignition energy requirements, even 
at temperatures well below those required 
for autoignition. A similarly strong 
synergistic interaction may also exist 
for chemical ignition sources, such as 
those generated by the oxidation of tramp 
metal particles, the frictional "ther-
mite" reaction between aluminum and 
steel, or even for unreacted explosives 
residues left in the fuel during its con-
ventional mining. Those factors require 
special study, but their influence could, 
in principle, be incorporated into the 
proper choice of the constant C. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The major conclusions and recommenda-
tions of this study are as follows. 
1. The use of the explosibility index 
(equation 3), which is comprised of the 
product of the ignition sensitivity 
(equation 1) and the explosion severity 
(equation 2), is not a realistic method 
of evaluting the explosion hazard of a 
dust, and should therefore no longer be 
used. The justification for this recom-
mendation has been presented in detail in 
the text. 
2. If, for practical classification 
purposes, it is necessary to characterize 
the intrinsic explosion susceptibility of 
a dust in terms of one single parameter, 
the most meaningful parameter to use is 
the lean limit of flammability measured 
in the limit of fine particle sizes. 
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3. A more complete evaluation of the 
intrinsic explosion properties of a dust 
can be obtained from a delineation of its 
flammability and thermal autoignition 
domains, as shown in figure 3. Thermal, 
electrical, and chemical ignitability be-
havior are describable in terms of ignit-
ability contours in that same temperature 
versus concentration space at constant 
pressure. 
4. It is essential that a quantitative 
parameter be developed for evaluating 
the dispersibility of a dust and its de-
pendence on particle size. (Such a pa-
rameter has not yet been proposed or 
developed.) 
5. A quantitative hazard assessment 
for a dust involves both the intrinsic 
flammability properties of the dust and 
the operating conditions in the facility 
whose hazard is to be evaluated. Three 
conditions or cofactors are involved in 
the occurrence of a dust explosion. The 
first involves the dispersion of the 
dust; the second involves the concentra-
tion of the dust, which must exceed the 
lean limit; the third involves the pres-
ence of an adequate ignition source. 
Each of those conditions or cofactors are 
quantifiable in terms of their individual 
probabilities: Pr(d), Pr(f), and Pr(f). 
Each probability may be defined in terms 
of the fraction of time the system or 
facility exists or operates in the haz-
ardous state. Pr(d) is the fraction of 
time the dust is dispersed; Pr(f) is the 
fraction of time a lean limit concentra-
tion exists in the system; Pr(i) is the 
fraction of time an effective ignition 
source is present. 
6. In those instances where the three 
factors are mutually independent of one 
another; that is, where their presence or 
absence are randomly distributed in time, 
the explosion frequency is predictable 
from the equation: 
f(expl) = Pr(j) Pr(k) f(l), 
where Pr(j) and Pr(k) are two of the 
aforementioned probabilities, and f(l) is 
the frequency of occurrence of the third 
and least frequent of the cofactors. 
7. In those instances where the co-
factors are not mutually independent of 
one another but are correlated in time 
such that they can occur in phase, the 
cofactors cannot be used separately and 
the hazard is magnified markedly. A neg-
ative correlation among the cofactors, 
which causes them to occur out of phase, 
provides a margin of safety that 
diminishes the hazard. 
8. The focus on a single one of those 
cofactors in a post-disaster investiga-
tion of an explosion does not provide for 
an adequate understanding of the causes 
of the explosion. Similarly, counter-
measures that emphasize only one of those 
cofactors at the exclusion of the others 
will generally be less cost effective 
than a balanced set of countermeasures 
that includes all cofactors and their 
temporal dependencies with respect to one 
another. 
9. If there is any single factor that 
provides the greatest margin of safety, 
it is the absence of a flammable dust 
concentration in which the condition 
Pr(f) = 0 is maintained throughout the 
system. 
10. The factors that determine the oc-
currence of an explosion have, in gen-
eral, little relationship to the severity 
of an explosion once it begins. 
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